In the recent matter of DPP v Surin [2025] EWHC 10 (KB), the Director of Public Prosecutions (“DPP”) was successful in pursuing a summary judgment application in their claim for recovery of £3.5mn in Bitcoin brought under section 266 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (“POCA”).
Summary
Alexander Surin (“Surin”) (previously known as Michael Singh Boparan) has proven to be an elusive criminal having been sentenced as early as 1996.
The DPP successfully obtained a freezing order of Surin’s Coinbase account on 28 June 2022 under section 245A POCA. This followed off the back of a criminal investigation into Surin, concerning the supply of Class A drugs between March and September 2020. The DPP relied heavily on inviting the Court to draw inference on Surin’s prior convictions, with the DPP’s witness evidence playing heavily on this. Reference was made to his conviction in 2013 in which assets frozen at the time consisted of property, expensive motor cars and cash in the region of £800,000. Further reference was made to the civil recovery order made against Surin in 2015 for the sum of £4.5mn with yet further instances being brought to light of Surin being seized with quantities of cash in the hundreds of thousands in 2005 and 2009. The Court also heard that Surin was subject to an Interpol Red Notice, which ultimately expired in 2018.
Through detailed blockchain investigations, it became apparent that Surin had established a Coinbase account and transacted with other known criminals. Critically, these transactions were deemed to be money laundering in relation to the supply of drugs. Two key transactions were identified on 27 June and 4 August 2020 from an account of a known and convicted criminal. Whilst these were for relatively nominal sums, the DPP advanced that there could be no doubt that Surin’s use of his Coinbase account was for the purpose of money laundering stemming from criminal proceeds.
Surin sought to advance the defence that since settlement of the most recent investigations into him in 2015, he had “turned a page” and established a legitimate business trading in gold, luxury watches and classic cars out of the UAE, where he was based.
Specifically, in respect of the two above referred transaction, Surin contended that these related to the supply of gold bullion from a purportedly well-established gold and diamond merchant in the UAE. Surin provided two ‘invoices’ for these transactions which, upon inspection of the document’s metadata, showed they were actually produced in December 2023. Quite remarkably, however, Surin failed to produce any form of accounts, invoices, trading records or the like despite averring to have been trading since at least 2015.
Plainly, Surin’s position was lacking, to put it kindly, which brought the DPP to bring an application for summary judgment pursuant to CPR 24.3. The Court saw through the defence advanced by Surin, contending a number of factors in support of this finding in that there were a large number of transactions into Surin’s Coinbase account for vast sums with nominal transactions out. If Surin was indeed a legitimate trader as he contended, one would expect regular payments in and out of the account which were overtly lacking.
The Court drew further inferences from Surin’s lack of engagement (further detailed below) both in respect of the freeze placed on his account in the proceedings more generally. In a similar vein as to the above, if he was indeed a legitimate trader, a freeze on his account would have been fatal to his business.
Consequently, at [142], Mould J determined “the Defendant’s innocent explanation of how the property came to be in his Account enjoys no realistic prospect of success”. On that basis, the DPP’s application for summary judgment was granted and 78.22 Bitcoin in the account (worth £3.5mn) was recovered.
Procedure
A fairly unglamorous point of procedure was also dealt with in this matter. As noted above, a Part 8 claim was issued on 24 March 2023. By 11 July 2023, no written evidence had been filed and so the DPP made an application for summary judgment on that date. Surin defended this application and at the hearing of the application on 7 December 2023, Master Gidden allowed further time for written evidence to be filed but made clear this was very much “last chance saloon” for Surin (at [11]).
Written evidence was eventually filed on 9 January 2024. The DPP’s application was eventually listed 15 July 2024, with further directions set down in advance of the hearing. Notably, no directions were provided for filing of further witness evidence for either party, and at no time did either party seek permission of the Court for filing of such evidence.
Nonetheless, on 2 July 2024, Surin filed further witness evidence with the DPP filing responsive evidence two days later. The DPP contended that Surin should not be permitted to rely on this further evidence pursuant to CPR 8.6(1), on the basis that this provision states that no written evidence may be relied on at the hearing of the claim unless either it has been served in accordance with rule 8.5 or the court gives permission.
However, the Court agreed with Surin’s reliance on CPR 24.2(3), as this governs the filing and service of evidence in response to an application for summary judgment, whereas, conversely, CPR 8.5 governs filing of evidence in response to a Part 8 claim. In essence, in absence of specific directions from the Court for filing of witness evidence, it was to be presumed that the timetable set out under CPR 24.5(3)(a) applied and which Surin had actually complied with.
With that said, allowing reliance on this witness evidence had no material baring on the outcome of the application. This was an archetypal instance of money laundering, and one which was of relative ease for the Court to determine.
Analysis
This case can be seen as another instance in line with recent judgments whereby crypto is at the heart of the case, but what is notable from the subsequent judgment are the issues of law and procedure. This case alone heard arguments on jurisdiction, correct procedure for issuing the claim and reliance on witness evidence. Rather underwhelmingly, the aspects pertaining to blockchain and crypto were barely touched from a technical standpoint, but instead limited to minor disputes of fact, which were easily overcome by the successful party.
Most readers will be familiar of the failings in D’Aloia, which saw submissions heard on and made determinations on both Tether (USDT) being a different form of property and the veracity of the expert evidence relied on.
Far gone are the days of being able to contend that crypto is the ‘wild west’, not least in the context of legal standings in England and Wales. It has been the Law Commission’s view[1] that the judiciary and common law is the most appropriate way to further the legal framework surrounding crypto. The Court is, therefore, under heavy burden to ensure cases such as these are dealt with thoroughly and this should be borne in mind when bringing such a claim.
Furthermore, guidance in the context of crypto related claims brought pursuant to POCA was provided, briefly, in The Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall Police v Emory Andrew Tate & Ors[2] whereby Senior District Judge Goldspring gave (obiter and admittedly quite high level) guidance at [117] as to application for forfeiture of crpytoassets brought under Part 5 Chapter 3 of POCA, stating “Once the transfer is executed, the freezing order will cease to apply and the prohibition on making withdrawals or payments, or using the crypto wallet in any other way, will no longer apply”.
Of particular interest is the approach adopted by the DPP in seeking summary judgment in a matter that was strongly opposed (cf. matters against Persons Unknown, as has been seen previously). The high bar of establishing “no real prospects of success” for defending the claim when Surin has a track record of being an elusive criminal will no doubt be cause for the DPP to flex its legal ambit and likely hope to deter other criminals in this regard.
One could see this as being a change in tides for the approach adopted by enforcement agencies. It is not particularly common for such authorities to pursue civil remedies, not least in the context of pursuing individuals located outside the jurisdiction. Perhaps a cynical interpretation of this is that given civil proceedings have a lower burden of proof than criminal prosecution, this may well be seen as ‘low hanging fruit’ whereby monies that are the proceeds of crime are becoming more attainable than seeking sentencing of criminals.
Conclusion
The landscape of crypto legislature and regulation necessarily continues to evolve. What one can see, however, is that it is now absolutely necessary, as a basic requirement, to have a comprehensive knowledge of the workings and technology of crypto and the blockchain. This is the minimum barrier to entry.
Those who are seeking to bring claims in this area must first overcome this basic hurdle, and thereafter turn their attention to ensuring their case is moulded to comply with the well established legislature and procedures in place. Matters such as the present case will likely fall to disputes of legal issues, rather than focussing on the nuance of cryptocurrencies and one would do well to have this at the forefront of their case management.

Rhys Evans – Jan 2025
[1] Law Commission Digital Asset Final Report June 2023
[2] See EMM’s analysis of this: Asset Forfeiture Orders and the case of the Tate Brothers